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ABSTRACT 
 
Many heterodox strands of thought share both a concern with the study of different phases or growth 
regimes in the history of capitalism and the use of formal short-run models as an analytical tool. This 
text suggests that: (1) this strategy is potentially misleading; (2) that the stock-flow consistent (SFC) 
approach, while providing a general framework that may facilitate the dialogue among those currents, 
is particularly well suited to all those who think that macroeconomic models may illuminate historical 
quests; and (3) this approach’s main intuitions may be conveyed through the “benchmark” Post 
Keynesian SFC model presented by Dos Santos and Zezza (2008), dispensing with the complex 
computer simulations that are normally employed by SFC authors. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Most heterodox economists cherish approaches that endeavor not to ignore time and history. They try 
to cope with uncertainty about the future. They want to state propositions as robust and realistic as 
possible about an object they know is always changing. They strive to discern both the permanent laws 
of movement and the historically contingent tendencies of such an elusive subject matter. And they 
expect their research to be a contribution to politics and policies, so that the change is for the better. 
However, the “brave army of heretics” (Keynes 1936) engages very diverse squadrons; more often than 
not they find it difficult to answer each other’s questions about their respective ways to wrestle with 
time. 
The first goal of this paper is to argue that the stock-flow consistent (SFC) approach may 
contribute to facilitate this dialogue, for it provides a general framework that allows one to integrate 
some important threads of the heterodox macroeconomic literature: the neo-Kaleckian structuralist 
current (e.g., Marglin and Bhaduri [1990} and Taylor [1991]), the “formal Minskyan literature” (see, 
for a survey, Dos Santos [2005]), and many of the various strands of thought (such as the “Régulation” 
School) that have tried to analyze the so-called financialization of modern capitalist economies (see 
Hein and Van Treeck [2008] and Van Treeck [2008] for surveys on financialization). In fact, we 
suggest that the SFC approach is particularly well-suited to all those who think that macroeconomic 
models may illuminate historical quests. 
  We are well aware, of course, that SFC heterodox models tend to be somewhat labyrinthine. 
The urge for realism has fostered the development of very large models that can only be analyzed with 
relatively complex computer simulations. Nevertheless, we believe that valuable insights can be 
obtained even with smaller (though still institutionally rich) SFC constructs. Indeed, the second goal of 
this paper is precisely to argue that the simplified, “benchmark,” Post Keynesian SFC model presented 
by Dos Santos and Zezza (2008): (i) sheds considerable new light on the findings of the 
aforementioned literatures while avoiding some of their shortcomings; and (ii) can be analyzed using 
only reasonably intuitive graphs.   
  In order to make these two points, we divide the remainder of this paper in four parts. The first 
comments on the aforementioned literatures, stressing what we believe are their relative merits and 
shortcomings. The second one revisits the Dos Santos and Zezza (henceforth DSZ) model, tries to 
explain it with the help of graphs, and argues that it encompasses many of the concerns of the 
literatures discussed in the previous section. The third one attempts to show that the conclusions  
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obtained in the DSZ model can be quite different in nature than what heterodox conventional wisdom 
would lead us to believe. The brief fourth section summarizes and concludes.   
 
1. THREE RELATED (AND PARTICULARLY INTERESTING) HETERODOX 
LITERATURES AND THE STOCK-FLOW CONSISTENT APPROACH 
 
Heterodox approaches do not employ the concept of a competitive general equilibrium configuration as 
a yardstick. That does not mean that they dispense with benchmarks; they rather define them in much 
looser and contingent ways. They may, for instance, stress (in a Marxian or Keynesian way) some 
permanent features or tendencies of capitalist economies and/or build upon stylized facts such as those 
identified by Kaldor. Given those benchmarks, these approaches tend to be much more interested in 
structural—therefore enduring—transformations in the way capitalist economies evolve in space and 
in time. These structural transformations originate new phases or growth regimes; involve changes in 
the distribution of income, wealth, and political power; and create and destroy institutions and redefine 
their roles. In most heterodox approaches, and certainly in the ones discussed here, history does really 
matter, for it continually changes some of the dynamic properties and long-run tendencies of the system.  
  The focus on historical change is clearly expressed in the two seminal papers published by Amit 
Bhaduri and Stephen Marglin in 1990. In fact, one of their main objectives was to understand why “the 
gospel of co-operative capitalism,” “a sensible one for the particular circumstances of the immediate 
post-war period” (Marglin and Bhaduri 1990: 175), was replaced by a “conflictual” situation from the 
1970s on. It is not an exaggeration, we believe, to suggest that Marglin and Bhaduri’s seminal insights 
are the heart and soul of the so-called “neo-Kaleckian” literature; see Blecker (2002) for a survey.   
  Hyman Minsky’s main objective, in turn, was to understand the dynamics of capitalists’ 
interrelated portfolios—and the ensuing fluctuations in income and employment—in a specific phase of 
capitalist development, characterized by the Big Government and the Big Bank. There have been many 
valuable efforts at formalizing Minsky’s insights in a second related literature; see Dos Santos (2005) 
for a survey.  
Finally, the historical concern is at the heart of the Régulation school quest. The school itself 
was created as an attempt to describe the demise of Fordism, understood as a particular way of 
conciliating profitability and mass production that blossomed at a global level during the Bretton 
Woods period. Régulationist authors have been busily occupied in identifying the main features of the 
historical configuration that has painfully emerged afterwards. Some of its main contributors have, in  
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recent years concluded that contemporary post Bretton Woods capitalism is a finance-led economy; see, 
for example, Aglietta (1995) and Boyer (2000). 
  The connection between the Bhaduri and Marglin papers and the régulationist démarche is 
pretty obvious: both approaches want to understand what has replaced the sort of historical 
configuration that allowed for—at least in developed countries—the combination of economic growth 
and somewhat egalitarian tendencies during the “golden years.” Given the upsurge in financial crises in 
the last (say) 30 years, it is no wonder that Minskyan insights on the factors that may progressively 
increase the financial fragility of firms and banks should be widely regarded as illuminating by people 
working in the other two heterodox approaches mentioned. In effect, it seems to us that the historical 
concern and the Kaleckian/Keynesian influence present in those three streams of literature suggest that 
a more intense dialogue among them is potentially fruitful, though still incipient.  
  There are, of course, many differences in scope and method among those currents. Not without 
a reason, the boldest project—the régulationist—has always tended to be mainly literary. Régulationist 
economists endeavor to understand the coherence of multiple layers—from the technological to the 
institutional, paying special attention to the relation between capital and labor and the nature of 
competition—of a historical configuration. There is no way such a wide purpose could be framed—
without drastic simplifications—into the models economists are able to devise. Eventually, however, 
some régulationist economists felt it would be useful to expose their ideas in simpler and more formal 
frameworks; there are some attempts at modeling both the Fordist and the contemporary finance-led 
regimes (on this, see Boyer [2000]).  
  Both the neo-Kaleckian and formal Minskyan literatures address much more specific questions, 
more suitable to be analyzed with the use of formal models. Marglin and Bhaduri wanted to know what 
happens to growth when income distribution changes. The formal Minskyan literature, in turn, strives 
to formally demonstrate the logical possibility of the financial cycles so richly described in Minsky 
(e.g., 1982 and 1986).  
It is not odd in the least that all those models only capture a small fraction of the much wider 
vision and concerns of their authors. This is only to be expected. This is not even a bad thing, provided 
one accepts that simplified models (if one allows us a pleonasm) can be useful to make a precise point 
or to illuminate a result that would tend to remain elusive if lost in a dense forest of words, and 
provided authors and interpreters do not treat those models as “a method of blind manipulations, which  
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will furnish an infallible answer” (Keynes 1936: 297).
1 Having said that, we can and should always ask 
whether the models built by those authors are really up to the task they were meant to perform.  
To us, it is certainly striking that all those attempts should be so similar in their nature and so 
limited in their scope. They are similar (and limited) in that they all appear to be short-run and 
somewhat incomplete (or too partial) models. The remainder of this section tries to develop this point. 
As Blecker (2002) makes clear, the papers published by Bhaduri and Marglin in 1990 
represented a path-breaking contribution to an ancient, yet never-ending, discussion in heterodox 
quarters about the dynamic implications of a change in functional income distribution. Bhaduri and 
Marglin (just like Boyer, as discussed below) intend to provide a model that allows one to “peer over 
the edge of the short period”
2 and say something about enduring phases—or regimes—in the history of 
capitalism (Bhaduri and Marglin 1990: 390 and Marglin and Bhaduri 1990: 155).
3 In fact, they do use 
their model to produce (brilliant) insights about the evolution of capitalism after World War II.  
We think there is no need to describe here such a widely discussed model.
4 It suffices to recall 
that it revolves around the slope and the elasticity of its peculiar IS curve, the properties of which, in 
turn, depend on the parameters that link investment decisions, the rate of utilization, and the profit 
share in aggregate income. There is just one conceptual experiment involved: an exogenous change in 
the distribution of income. The impact on the profit rate and on investment and income levels depend 
on the aforementioned parameters; the combinations between the possible results allow the authors to 
define four possible regimes.  
The demise of the golden years is then interpreted by the authors as the transition from a 
“cooperative-stagnationist” regime to a “conflictual-stagnationist” one (Marglin and Bhaduri 1990: 
173). This is certainly a very appealing result and may well be a fairly good approximation at historical 
truth. Nevertheless, we may question whether this proposition can really be derived, with a fair amount 
of confidence, from their model.  
In other words, we are not convinced of Marglin and Bhaduri’s (1990: 160) claim that their 
“model describes a longer run than the textbook short run in which capacity utilization is the sole 
                                                         
1 As Keynes warns on the same page, we must “keep at the back or our heads the necessary reserves and qualifications and 
the adjustments which we shall have to make later on,” if we are, we add, to study a historical process, make a forecast, or 
recommend a policy. 
2 What Keynes hardly ever did, according to Joan Robinson, and most Post Keynesians hardly ever do, according to 
Macedo e Silva and Dos Santos (2008). 
3 Moreover, they intend to “release” Keynesian theory “from the marginal role that the mainstream has accorded [it] as a 
theory of no relevance to understanding the functioning of the capitalist economy apart from the short period” (Marglin and 
Bhaduri 1990: 183).  
4 Blecker (2002) provides a discussion about the origins of the model, a formal benchmark model, and a survey of the 
literature it elicited.  
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adjusting variable.” That is to say, their model effectively goes a step further—for it furnishes the 
investment in the accounting period immediately after the exogenous shock—but this is as far as it goes.  
Marglin and Bhaduri describe their papers as an attempt at rescuing a sensible (Keynesian) 
conception from a misleading (stubbornly stagnationist) model. Though we partake their 
(Keynesian/Kaleckian) conception, we think that their (short-run) model may be an unreliable guide—
thus potentially a misleading one—to long-run concerns. We have two reasons for that. The first is that 
we subscribe to Kalecki’s (1968) view that the long run is nothing but a sequence of short runs, and we 
believe that this sequence (which may or not lead to a steady state) must be built, laboriously 
connecting the periods. It cannot be presumed on the basis of a single-period exercise: just as we 
cannot make a movie out of two photograms, we cannot derive a growth regime from such a short-run 
exercise. 
The second reason is that we are deeply convinced that heterodox economists must—and 
already can—develop models that do some justice to the complexity of the political economy of 
capitalism, as envisaged by Keynes already in his Tract (1923). To do that, it is necessary to face some 
of the “financial complications”—such as the influence of stock exchange and the rate of interest—that 
Bhaduri and Marglin (1990: 377n) chose to abstract in their papers.  
At his point, heterodox economists who do not abhor formal models might want to resort to 
Minskyan models. After all, more than anyone else, Minsky (with Davidson) tried to call forth the 
financial details that fell “into the background” in Keynes’s (1936: vii) General Theory. Unfortunately, 
though, this quest is likely to be somewhat disappointing. Most of the formal Minskyan literature spins 
around the specification of a (often idiosyncratic) investment function that can produce a reversion of 
the economic cycle (Dos Santos 2005). Strange as it may seem, scarce attention is paid to Minsky’s 
stories about how financing and spending decisions determine how interconnected portfolios evolve in 
time, creating fragility or addressing the problems this fragility poses to economic growth. In other 
words, such central aspects of the creation and the distribution of financial power in capitalist 
economies—all the more essential in the financialization era—that were missing “details” in the 
General Theory (on this, see Macedo e Silva [2009]) are also missing in the formal Minskyan literature.  
We will not discuss here the many authors whose contributions to the comprehension of 
financialization issues were mainly phrased in literary terms. It is only fair to acknowledge that some of 
them (like Aglietta [1995]) were not only among the first to identify the phenomenon, but were capable, 
as well, of producing powerful intuitions about it (see, for instance, Duménil and Lévy [2005]).
 5 
                                                         
5 As other papers in the book edited by Epstein (2005).  
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However, we will stick to our point that our “brave army” needs the discipline that can only be 
provided by a common formal framework.
6  
Boyer (2000) is an assumedly “preliminary” attempt in this direction. The paper intends to 
present a “steady-state model describing the full implementation” of a “financialized growth regime.”
7 
We deeply sympathize with Boyer’s way of phrasing his quest, for we believe—for reasons to be 
explored in the next section—that the study of steady states, far from being a sterile abstraction, may 
reveal some important structural features of a historical formation. 
Financialization implies, in Boyer’s model, first that a “profitability norm” is imposed by 
financial markets on firms
8 and second that changes in the value of financial assets affect consumption 
decisions in a decisive way.  
Beginning with the first point, we note that a change in the profitability norm has net effects on 
consumption and investment (and hence on aggregate production and income) that will depend on the 
value of the specific parameters used to calibrate the model. Ceteris paribus, a rise in the profitability 
norm reduces retained profits and (somehow)
9 real wages as well, thus affecting investment and 
consumption negatively. In the case that Boyer describes as a “fully financialized growth regime,” this 
rise in the norm determines an increase in profits, wealth, aggregate demand, and production.
10 This 
happens because somehow the reduction in real wages increases profits
11 and therefore wealth, which 
in turn has a net positive effect on consumption;
12 the net increase in aggregate demand may then 
produce a net increase in investment.
13  
So a rise in the profitability norm can have “exhilarating” results. Does this mean that Boyer’s 
objective of describing the steady state of a financialized growth regime was accomplished? 
Unfortunately, it seems to us it did not.  
                                                         
6 In fact, as Van Treeck (2008) shows, the contributions to this literature sometimes falter exactly because of the lack of 
clarity that a good (Kaleckian, according to him) macroeconomic framework can provide. 
7 Please note that his article is much more ambitious, for it tries to describe, literarily and with the usage of complex 
diagrams, “how financialization affects all institutional forms” (Boyer 2000: 118). It also presents a very interesting survey 
of attempts at coping with contemporary capitalism.  
8 That is to say, shareholder value orientation requires firms to satisfy this profitability norm before accumulating (i.e., 
retaining) profits.  
9 Boyer does not provide, for example, an (price?) equation that would connect changes in the profitability norm and 
aggregate real wages.  
10 Compensating, at least in part, the negative effect over aggregate real wages. 
11 Since Kalecki we know that there is no direct opposition between aggregate wages and profits, for they are not slices of a 
given pie. Boyer does not make explicit the assumptions he is using to get this result. Of course, a clear explanation of the 
connections between wages and profits can be obtained in Bhaduri and Marglin’s 1990 papers. 
12 Strangely enough, in Boyer’s model the fraction of aggregate profits earmarked by the profitability norm does not 
reappear anywhere.  
13 In a Fordist configuration, the final effect of a rise in this norm on the level of activity is a contraction in the level of 
activity—a “stagnationist” result, in Marglin and Bhaduri’s terminology.   
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While recognizing—just like us—Boyer’s contribution as seminal, Van Treeck (2008: 11) 
criticizes the model for being too simple: some of the many important dimensions of contemporary 
capitalism are missing.
14 Though this is certainly true, what we want to underline is the fact that Boyer 
does not seem to go beyond an exercise in short-run comparative statics: all we know is that the 
exogenous shock just mentioned produces a new (and higher) income level in the next accounting 
period. Boyer does not demonstrate that the system attains or converges towards a higher growth rate.
15 
Therefore, the time span of his model seems to be as short as that of Marglin and Bhaduri’s.  
Some of the missing dimensions pinpointed by Van Treeck (2008) were contemplated in two 
recent SFC papers: Lavoie (2007) and Van Treeck (2007). The latter
16 can be said to present a simpler 
model, for it depicts an economy without government.
17 Lavoie’s model is by far more complex: 
besides separating government and the central bank, it describes in a more realistic fashion the 
portfolios of agents (especially households’). It also explores more changes in parameters.
18 In spite of 
these differences, both have in common the method chosen to execute the experiments—they resort to 
simulations. Lavoie (2007: 2) is the first to admit one (or, according to him, the major) “drawback” of 
the method: “some of the results could be, and in many cases certainly are, sensitive to the values taken 
by the assumed parameters.” Though we are convinced that simulations may be quite useful,
19 we 
contend that their inner complexity—and, in some cases, arbitrariness—may have been acting as a 
major obstacle to the diffusion of the approach and to the fluidity of the conversation among the many 
heterodox currents. Happily enough, we think there is an alternative: a simpler SFC model which can 
simultaneously satisfy some of the heterodox demands for realism and convey at least some of the most 
important intuitions of the approach, while allowing for analytical solutions for some interesting 
conceptual experiments. There is room, thus, for recasting (old and new) heterodox issues both in SFC 
analytical models and in computer simulations. 
 
                                                         
14 “Boyer’s (2000) model is incomplete in some respects, such as the absence of a public and a foreign sector, the omission 
of firms’ and households’ financial decisions (share issues or buybacks, debt-financing of investment or consumption, 
distribution of dividends, interest payments), and the absence of an asset price determination mechanism” (VanTreeck 
2008). Skott and Ryoo (2008: 828) correctly criticize the lack of “a more careful modeling of the stock-flow relations” in 
Boyer’s article.  
15 It should be mentioned that, although Boyer claims to present a steady-state model, he writes that he is only examining its 
short-run equilibrium.  
16 The conceptual experiments discussed in the paper are “an increase in the dividend payout ration of non-financial firms” 
and a “reduction in the contribution of new equity issues to the financing of physical investment” (VanTreek 2007: 1). 
17 This is also, incidentally, the case of Skott and Ryoo (2008), which differs from ours in that it explicitly plays down the 
importance of Minskyan insights.  
18 Such as changes in the target proportion of retained earnings to investment or the households’ propensity to hold equities, 
and the latter’s propensity to take loans.  
19 In fact, the first author of this paper is responsible for many of them!   
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2. REVISITING THE DOS SANTOS AND ZEZZA (2008) MODEL: STRUCTURE AND 
GRAPHICAL ANALYSIS OF THE STEADY-STATE EQUILIBRIUM 
 
 Besides necessarily reflecting an aesthetic judgement, the “adequate” level of detail and/or “realism” 
of any economic model depends crucially on the precise issues it attempts to illuminate. Given our 
purposes, the highly simplified and stylized model presented by Dos Santos and Zezza (2008) seems a 
decent starting point.
20 In this section we revisit the nature of the structural assumptions of the latter 
and present a graphical (and, we hope, intuitive) analysis of its steady-state equilibrium and 
dynamics—directing readers more interested in the model’s algebraic details to the original (and, 
perhaps, somewhat less accessible) article. 
 
2.1  The Structure of the Model and its Assumed Short-Period Behavior   
Like most closed economy SFC models, DSZ assumes an economy consisting of households, firms, 
banks, and the government. As presented in table 1, households are assumed to hold bank deposits and 
firms’ equities, while firms are assumed to hold capital goods financed with equity emissions and bank 
loans (and retained profits, as discussed below). Banks, in turn, are assumed to “use” households’ 
deposits to make loans to firms and to buy government bills—which are issued by the government to 
allow it to finance its deficits.  
 
Table 1. Aggregate Balance Sheets of the Institutional Sectors 
Assets/Sectors  Households  Firms  Banks  Government  Total 
Bank Deposits  +D    -D    0 
Bank Loans    -L  +L    0 
Government 
Bills 
    +B  -B  0 
Capital Goods    +pK      +pK 
Equities  +peE  -peE      0 
Net Worth  Vh  Vf  0  -B  +pK 
Note: Positive variables are assets, while negative ones are liabilities; pe stands for the price of one equity; p stands for the 
price of the single good produced by firms. 
   
This particular choice of (sectoral) assets and liabilities was not made by chance, of course. In 
fact, it seems to us that any model economy attempting to illuminate Minskyan or financialization 
insights has at least to have bank loans to firms, a stock-market, and allow for the possibility of “big 
                                                         
20 According to Dos Santos and Zezza (2008: 475) their model was inspired by the seminal contribution by Lavoie and 
Godley (2001–2002). The idea was to try to both simplify Lavoie and Godley´s original contribution (“in order to get well 
defined long-period results”) and to extend it (“so as to allow the discussion of fiscal and monetary policies”).   
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government” stabilizing interventions. On the other hand, one has to keep in mind that—despite its 
apparent simplicity and the fact that no flow variables have been introduced so far—the artificial 
economy above already has nine endogenous variables (i.e., D, pe, E, Vh, Vf, B, p, K, and L). In order 
to keep the dimension of the model manageable, DSZ assumed away all features of reality they felt 
were not crucial for their purposes—such as, for example, high-powered money (so people are assumed 
to only buy things using bank checks in the model), bank loans to households (so people are assumed 
to never get into debt), the stock of capital of the government (which is zero because government 
investment is assumed to be zero), households’ holding of government bills (which are zero because 
government bills are assumed to pay the same interest rates as bank deposits), and so on.  Moreover, 
and also to simplify matters (in a first approximation, at least), the price level p is assumed to be fixed, 
so the DSZ model is fix-price in the sense of Hicks (1965).  
  Important as it may be to know the precise composition of the sectoral balance sheets in any 
given point in time, the focus of SFC models is in the evolution of these balance sheets through time. It 
so happens—and this is the quintessential SFC insight—that the latter is entirely determined by the 
assumptions one makes about the short-period flow behavior and portfolio choices of the sectors. More 
precisely, both the steady state and the dynamic trajectory of the system are bound to change with each 
and every change in the set of hypotheses and parameters assumed about the latter variables (for every 
sector). For example, the steady state(s) of a system assuming a simplified Keynesian consumption 
function (or, say, a Harrodian investment function) will be different from the steady state(s) of a system 
assuming that aggregate consumption depends on the level of households’ wealth (or, say, a neo-
Kaleckian investment function), and so on. 
  We therefore feel we have to address a couple of methodological points before we go on 
discussing the DSZ model. The first point is whether or not it is useful to study the steady states of 
these systems. The second point is what can be said in general about the latter (since they depend on so 
many variables).  
  In fact, and as discussed in Macedo e Silva and Dos Santos (2008), we believe it is quite useful 
to know whether or not a SFC system is converging or diverging from any given steady state. For, if 
the system is diverging, this means that at least some ratios among important macroeconomic 
variables—say, the firms’ loans-to-capital ratio, households’ wealth-to-income ratio, or banks’ loans-
to-deposits ratio, and so on—are getting increasingly smaller (larger). And, as pointed out by Godley 
and Cripps (1983), these events often do not last long—for these ratios rarely approach zero or 
infinity—and one is bound to learn a lot from them whenever they do last long. For example, the debt- 
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to-income ratio of the American households grew considerably in the 1993–2007 period; this had a lot 
to do with the economic crisis of 2008.      
  To be sure, a full SFC steady state is only achieved when the (short-period behavior) parameters 
of the system are kept constant,
21 and there is no reason to believe this will be the case in any actual 
economy. Note, however, that even though no one has ever argued that the propensity to consume of 
American households remained fixed throughout the 1993–2007 years, we believe few would disagree 
that it remained quite high during this period. In cases like that (at least), the simplifying assumption of 
fixed parameters—and therefore the use of SFC steady states (or of the fact that the economy appears 
to be diverging from them)—dispenses with unnecessary complications and allows one to obtain a 
decent approximation of the economy’s actual dynamic process.   
Now, it is also fair to point out that the only good reason to leave blank spaces in table 1 
above—or, for that matter, to adopt a closed economy as a starting point—is the need to keep the 
model “under control,” so to speak.  We are well aware, of course, that the sectoral structure and the 
actual balance sheets of modern capitalist economies are infinitely more complex than the ones 
depicted in table 1,
22 and, as mentioned above, each and every structural change (say, the inclusion of a 
sector or even an asset) in the artificial balance sheets depicted above is bound to change the nature of 
the steady state of the model.  
As pointed out earlier, we believe that the level of detail adopted here is sufficient to allow us to 
make the points we want to make in this particular text. In fact, it seems to us that many of the insights 
we get from the simplified structure above can also illuminate more complex analyses.  No matter how 
complex the SFC model at hand, it is always true—by definition, of course—that in its (growth) steady 
state all components of all balance sheets assumed in the model will have to grow at the same rate. 
Moreover, this rate will have to be equal to the rate of growth of all flow variables assumed in the 
model—for these logically determine the growth of the stock variables. We hope readers will agree that 
these (general) points can be made clearer in the context of the simplified model discussed in this 
section than in more complex contexts.   
  It is customary that, after presenting the sectoral balance sheets, authors in the SFC tradition 
will go on presenting their precise hypotheses about each and every flow variable and portfolio 
decision assumed in their model. We follow a different approach here, for two basic reasons. First, the 
                                                         
21 For that reason, Macedo e Silva and Dos Santos (2008) interpret the SFC steady state as a generalization of Keynes´ long-
period equilibrium. 
22 As Duncan Foley has told one of us, the model above can be said to represent much better the financial structures of, say, 
the 1950s than present ones.    
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algebra of the precise assumptions made in the DSZ model is already carefully presented in the original 
article. Second, we believe that it is both possible and desirable to present the model in a more intuitive, 
literary way. It seems to us, in particular, that having to read many pages of algebra tends to discourage 
people who could potentially sympathize with the approach.    
  We will proceed, then, first by presenting a brief list of what we believe are the most important 
behavioral assumptions made in the DSZ model and second by discussing their implications to its long-
period steady state. The use of algebra will be kept to a minimum.  
The key hypotheses are five. The first one is that aggregate consumption is assumed to depend 
both on the level and the (functional) distribution of income (as in Kalecki [1954] and Marglin and 
Bhaduri [1990], inter alia) and on the level of households’ wealth (as in Modigliani and Brumberg 
[1954] and Godley [1999], inter alia). More precisely, the hypothesis is that households can be divided 
into workers, who are assumed to consume whatever income they can get (so as to save and have 
nothing), and rentiers, who are assumed to be rich and to consume a fixed fraction of their wealth.
23 In 
other words, in any given short period, the aggregate propensity to save is assumed to be a positive 
function of the profit-share and a negative function of households’ (i.e., rentiers’) wealth-to-income 
ratio.  
  Two other important features of the DSZ model are the facts that it assumes: (i) a neo-
Kaleckian investment function, according to which investment responds positively both to increases in 
capacity utilization and to increases in the mass of profits received by firms; and (ii) that government 
tax revenues are a fixed fraction of total income, while government expenditures are a fixed fraction of 
the economy’s stock of capital. 
  The fourth hypothesis is that firms are able to finance whatever level of investment they want—
getting bank loans if their desired investment is higher than the sum of their retained earnings and the 
amount of cash they get from selling equities. The stock of issued equities and the liquidity preference 
of rentiers determine the price of equities.     
  The fifth hypothesis is that there are no expectation mistakes in the short period. This implies 
that in each short period (of, say, one year) the level of output is in equilibrium. Given that rentiers’ 
wealth is assumed to affect consumption positively, this last hypothesis implies also that the level of 
output is a positive function of rentiers’ wealth. 
                                                         
23 This assumption merely radicalizes what Keynes (1936: 93; see also p. 94) wrote in his General Theory: “The 
consumption of the wealth-owning class may be extremely susceptible to unforeseen changes in the money-value of its 
wealth. This should be classified amongst the major factors capable of causing short-period changes in the propensity to 
consume.”  
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  So, in any given year, things happen pretty much as in, for example, Marglin and Bhaduri 
(1990)—with the important caveats that financial markets are incorporated in the model (in a standard 
heterodox-Keynesian way) and that our specific consumption function makes the economy decidedly 
stagnationist (in the short run, we emphasize; more on that below).  
It is also important to observe that, despite its simplicity, the models allow one to examine 
many of the phenomena that the recent literature has identified as features of financialization, such as 
the occurrence of credit or stock-market booms, a rise in interest rates, or in the dividend payout ratio.
24 
Given the lack of space and the interest in stressing the nature of the steady state in the model, we 
refrained from exploring such events in this text.
25 
 
2.2  The Steady State of the Model (I): The b-g Curve    
As mentioned earlier in the text, there is no good reason we should restrict ourselves to the short run, 
and in the long period the picture gets considerably more complex. We begin by noting that in the 
steady state of the DSZ model—and, in fact, in the growth steady state of all SFC models—it is always 
true (by definition) that all stocks and flows assumed will grow at the same rate.
26 This is precisely 
why the SFC steady state is a useful benchmark, by the way. For if, say, any one stock variable is 
growing faster than another one, this implies that the sectoral balance sheets (and, therefore, the 
economy’s financial conditions) are changing in a meaningful way.
27  
In particular (and assuming that the liquidity preference of rentiers is fixed and therefore there 
are no capital gains or losses
28), the steady state of DSZ is a situation in which the net wealth of all 
sectors grows at the same rate as the stock of capital:  
 
SAVht /Vht−1 = - SAVgt/ Bt−1 = gk. 
                                                         
24 Though it would not be difficult to introduce in the model empirically crucial aspects such as household’s real estate and 
credit, this might require the use of computer simulations, which we are expressly trying to avoid for reasons already 
mentioned. 
25 An enduring asset boom should probably be dealt with in the context of a medium-run analysis. 
26 Therefore, to each steady state, there will be a given capacity utilization and a distribution of net wealth among economic 
agents. For instance, there will be a given ratio between government debt and aggregate wealth, as well as between rentiers’ 
wealth and aggregate wealth. 
27 It can indicate, for example, that some sector is becoming more “financially fragile” in Minskyan terms. More generally, 
if one assumes, like Macedo e Silva and Dos Santos (2008), that the size and the composition of the sectoral balance sheets 
are good proxies for the power structure of any given economy, it is always possible to interpret any continuous change of 
the composition of these balance sheets in any given direction in political economy terms.     
28 Changes in the liquidity preference of rentiers imply changes in their demand for firms’ equities, and therefore are 
assumed to affect the price of these equities and the stock of rentiers’ wealth (which depends on the latter price). In the 
steady state, rentiers’ liquidity preference is fixed, so rentiers’ demand for equities will grow at the same rate of rentiers’ 
wealth and firms’ supply of equities (and, for that matter, at the same rate as all other stocks and flows of the economy) so 
the price of equities remains fixed.    
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where SAVh stands for rentiers’ saving (since workers are assumed to save nothing), SAVg stands for 
government’s saving (i.e., government tax revenues minus government expenditures in goods and 
interest payments), and gk stands for the rate of growth in capital stock (i.e., gk =ΔKt/ Kt−1). In words, 
in the steady state of the DSZ model (and of any SFC model, for that matter), the rate of growth of 
households’ (i.e., rentiers’, in the case of the DSZ model) wealth is equal to the rate of growth of 
government debt (assumed positive) and the rate of growth of the capital stock.
29  In the remainder of 
this section we focus on the implications of these equilibrium conditions for the graphical analysis of 
the long-period steady state of the DSZ model. 
  We begin by noting that, given the hypotheses mentioned above, government deficits will be 
lower the higher capacity utilization is. Indeed, if the latter goes up, then the tax revenue increases 
relatively to government expenditures (in goods and interest payments), so government saving goes up 
(or, what is the same thing, government deficit goes down). But we saw before that—in any given short 
period—capacity utilization is a positive function of rentiers’ wealth. So, it is safe to say that, ceteris 
paribus, the higher rentiers’ wealth is, the higher will be capacity utilization and the lower will be the 
government deficit.  
Moreover, DSZ’s neo-Kaleckian investment function is such that the higher rentiers’ wealth is 
(and therefore capacity utilization), the higher is the rate of growth of the capital stock.  
  So, it is possible to draw a conclusion that the equality between the rates of growth of the stock 
of government debt and the stock of capital requires that higher (lower) ratios between rentiers’ wealth 
and the stock of capital are associated with lower (higher) ratios between government debt and the 
stock of capital, as in figure 1.
30 It may be easier to grasp the meaning of this point if one supposes two 
“alternative realities” in which two different steady states have built, at some point, the same stock of 
capital. In reality A, the rate of growth of the capital stock (gk) has been 3% and the government deficit 
in the current period is $3. It is then clear that the economy can only be in the steady state if 
government debt is $100—for this would imply a rate of growth of the government debt equal to gk. In 
reality B, however, rentiers´ wealth is higher, so capacity utilization and gk are also higher and the 
government deficit is lower. Let us assume that gk has been, say, 5% and the government deficit is (say) 
$2; then it should be clear that the steady state requires a government debt equal to $40.
31   
                                                         
29 As discussed in more detail in section 2.4 below, these are necessary and sufficient conditions for the steady state of the 
DSZ model. 
30 Note that we are implicitly assuming here what Dos Santos and Zezza (2008: 466) call an “American regime.” 
31 At a first glance, the fact that the variables in the example above are measured in monetary units may give the impression 
of lack of generality. After all, we are dealing with an economy in which all stocks and flows are supposed to be growing 
and, therefore, the relevant steady state is one in which the ratios among the variables are fixed—that is to say, a situation in  
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  The reasoning above allows us to state that one necessary condition for the steady state of the 
DSZ model is that the economy is in the curve b-g in figure 1.





2.3  The Steady State of the Model (II): The v-g Curve    
In DSZ’s steady state, it is also true that the rate of growth of households’ wealth should be equal to gk. 
In order to understand how this could happen, we need first to take a closer look at the (admittedly 
complex) households’ saving function assumed by DSZ. Beginning with simpler points, we note that 
the assumption that workers spend what they get implies that only rentier households save in the model. 
Moreover, the assumption that rentiers consume a fixed fraction of their wealth implies that rentiers 
save whatever income they get above this amount.   
  And how much is that? Well, rentiers’ income is assumed to consist of the distributed profits 
they receive from banks and firms, plus the interest payments they receive on their money deposits in 
banks. As such, it depends crucially on variables that are quite dear to people discussing 
financialization issues, such as firms’ distributed profits and stock of debt—even though less popular 
variables, such as banks’ distributed profits (and therefore the stock of public debt), also play an 
important role. 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
which all stock-stock, stock-flow, and flow-flow ratios are fixed (and hence the fact that the variables in the graph above are 
normalized by the stock of capital). We therefore stress that the “lesson” of the numerical example above is true for any 
given level of the capital stock.   
32 In DSZ, the b-g curve is actually a hyperbola. Rigorously speaking, figure 1 should be interpreted as depicting a linear 
approximation of the actual b-g curve.    
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  Here a little bit of algebra is in demand. The precise households’ (i.e., rentiers’) saving equation 
assumed by DSZ is:   
 
SAVht = ibt−1Dt−1+ Fdt + Fbt - aVht−1                      (1) 
 
where ibt−1Dt−1 is the amount of interest rentiers receive from banks on their money deposits, Fdt and 
Fbt stand, respectively, for the distributed profits of firms and banks, and aVht−1 is rentiers’ 
consumption (which, as noticed above, is assumed to be a fixed fraction, a, of their wealth in the 
beginning of the “short period”).   
  We need to be more specific at this point about the precise assumptions made about Fdt and Fbt. 
Fortunately enough, these are quite intuitive. Banks, for instance, are assumed to distribute all their 
profits:  
 
Fbt = ilt−1Lt−1+ibt−1Bt−1− ibt−1Dt−1                         (2) 
 
or, in words, banks’ distributed profits are equal to their total profits—i.e., the money they make from 
their loans to firms and from their holdings of public debt  minus the amount of interest they pay to 
rentiers on their deposits.  
  The hypothesis about the distributed profits from firms is also quite simple. Firms are assumed 
to distribute a fixed part of their profits after taxes and interest payments to banks, so that: 
 
 Fdt = µ [(1−θ)πY−ilt−1Lt−1]                (3)       
 
where µ, θ, π, and Y stand, respectively, for: (i) the fixed share of firms’ total profits that is distributed 
(µ); (ii) the tax rate (θ); (iii) the profit share (π); and (iv) aggregate income (and product, Y). So πY is 
the mass of profits before taxes and interest payments,  (1−θ)πY is the mass of profits after taxes, but 
before interest payments, and (1−θ)πY−ilt−1Lt−1 is the mass of profits after taxes and after  interest 
payments.   
  Replacing equations (2) and (3) in equation (1) one obtains a more transparent equation for 
rentiers’ saving: 
 
 SAVht= µ(1−θ)πY + (1− µ) ilt−1Lt−1 +ibt−1Bt−1 - aVht−1           (4)        
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Indeed, equation (4) makes clear that—as one would expect—rentiers’ income depends on many 
variables, such as interest rates,
33 the dividend policies of firms, the tax rate on profits, the level of 




  In order to proceed with our argument, we need now to take a closer look at the relationship 
between the stocks of public debt, bank loans to firms, and rentiers’ wealth. We begin by noting that, 
by our own hypothesis about the balance sheet of the banking sector (see table 1), we have that L+B≡D. 
Moreover, the model assumes that the stock of rentiers’ bank deposits is a fraction of their total wealth 
(given by their liquidity preference parameter 1-δ), so that D = (1-δ)Vh and L = (1-δ)Vh - B. We can, 
therefore, use this fact to rewrite equation (4) above as:    
 
SAVht= µ(1−θ)πY + [ibt−1 - (1− µ) ilt−1] Bt−1 + [(1-δ)(1− µ)ilt−1 – a]Vht−1      (5)  
 
Before we go on to discuss equation (5) in more detail, we note that the intuition underlying the 
requirement that L+B≡D has everything to do with what Minsky (e.g, 1986: 33) called the “balance 
sheet implications” (of “Big Government”). Discussing the reasons why the 1975 U.S. recession was 
mild when compared to the “deep depressions of the past,” Minsky (1986) argued that:   
 
“[…] whenever Big Government generates a huge deficit during a 
recession, other sectors, including financial organizations such as banks 
[…] acquire the government debt issued to finance the deficit. […] We 
live in an economy with a complex financial system. In this system the 
surplus sectors—in 1975 it was households—are not required to acquire 
directly the liabilities of deficit units. Instead, they can finance these 
deficits indirectly by acquiring the liabilities of financial institutions. In 
our economy, banks […] are likely to be the immediate owners of the 
debts of business, government […]. Households acquire the liabilities of 
financial institutions such as […] deposits. Consequently, much of the 
direct impact of swings in deficits and surpluses among sectors will be 
on the assets acquired and sold by financial institutions.” 
 
 
   
                                                         
33 Note that the interest rate paid by firms, il, is assumed to be higher than the interest rate paid by the government and the 
banks, ib. 
34 Equation (4) is interesting also because it makes clear the fact that the interest payments made by firms to banks reduce 
the dividends firms pay to households. This is the reason why the amount of interest paid by firms on their bank loans 
(ilt−1Lt−1) appears multiplied by (1− µ) in the rentiers’ saving equation, even though all interest payments made by firms on 
their bank loans end up in rentiers’ pockets (for banks are assumed to distribute all their profits to rentiers).   
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So, it is pretty clear that our way of modeling the banking sector is Minskyan in making explicit 
the fact that increases (in the government deficit and therefore) in B increase D and/or reduce L—and 
therefore are associated with increases in private saving.
35 So it is perhaps intuitive to state that the 
higher is the value of Vh, the higher will be the value of B (given its positive impact on rentiers’ saving) 
required to make the rate of growth of rentiers’ wealth equal to the rate of growth of capital. As we 
noted before, higher values of Vh (given the stock of capital) are associated with higher levels of 
capacity utilization and investment and, therefore, higher rates of growth of capital. Moreover, higher 
values of Vh imply that higher levels of rentiers’ saving are required to prevent the rate of growth of 
rentiers’ wealth (given by SAVh/Vh) from decreasing.  So the only way one can have both the stocks 
of capital and of rentiers’ wealth growing at the same rate with Vh increasing (relative to the stock of 
capital) is if B is also increasing (relative to the stock of capital). This point is perhaps more easily 
understood with the help of a numerical example. Assume, for instance, that rentiers’ wealth is $100 
and that the rate of growth of the capital stock (gk) is 3%.  It is then clear that the economy can only be 
in the steady state if rentiers’ saving is $3—for this would imply a rate of growth of the stock of 
rentiers’ wealth equal to gk. If, however, Vh increases, say, to $150 so that gk increases to 5%, the new 
steady state requires that rentiers’ saving increases to $7.50 (so as to make SAVh/Vh equal to 0.05). If 
increases in B are associated with higher rentiers’ saving, this will require higher values of B.  
  The reasoning above allows us to state that one necessary condition for the steady state of the 





                                                         
35 The same point is made (rather differently) in Minsky’s “sketch of a model” (of the effects of “Big Government”), 
published originally in 1963 and republished as the first chapter of Minsky (1982). 
36 In DSZ the v-g curve is actually a parabola. Rigorously speaking, figure 2 should be interpreted as depicting a linear 
approximation of the actual v-g curve  
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  There is one last point we need to make regarding equation (5) before we can finish this section. 
The point is that it is not actually necessary that (for any given stock of capital) increases in 
government debt will increase rentiers’ saving. It is, of course, true in neo-Kaleckian models that 
increases in government debt will necessarily increase private saving. Indeed, it is well known that in 
any closed economy with a government we have that: 
 
Y ≡ C + I + G,  
 
so that, subtracting government income after transfers and interest payments (T) in both sides and 
rearranging, we get:  
 
Y – T – C – I ≡ G – T 
or  
SAVp – I ≡ G – T ≡ - SAVg, 
 
where SAVp stands for private saving. It is therefore clear that—providing no assumption of crowding-
out of private investment is made
37—higher government deficits (and therefore debt) are associated 
with higher values of SAVp.  
  But private saving is not the same thing as rentiers’ saving
38 and this is reflected in the algebra 
of equation (5). Indeed, the sign of B is not unambiguously positive in equation (5), depending on the 
relative sizes of the interest rates on government debt and bank loans (ib and il) and on the precise 
fraction of firms profits (after taxes and interest payments) that is distributed to rentier households (µ). 
The point here is that if the fraction of firms’ distributed profits to rentiers is low enough and/or the 
interest on bank loans is high enough (related to the interest the government pays to banks on its debt) 
then the reduction in L caused by the increase in B may decrease banks’ profits (which are entirely 
distributed to rentiers) more than increase the amount of firms’ profits which is distributed to rentiers, 
therefore reducing—as opposed to increasing—rentiers’ saving.  In this case, the slope of the v-g curve 
would be negative as opposed to positive, as depicted in figure 2.   
                                                         
37 Note that in neo-Kaleckian models increases in the government deficit are expansionary and therefore increase 
investment.  
38 For private saving is the sum of households’, firms’, and banks’ saving. In the context of the DSZ model—given the 
hypotheses that workers and banks do not save—private saving equals firms’ retained profits plus rentiers’ saving.   
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2.4  The Full Steady State of the DSZ Model  (III): The Long-Period Equilibrium of the Model 
Understood as the Intersection of the v-g and b-g Curves    
 
The full growth steady state of the model happens when both equilibrium conditions are satisfied, i.e. 




   
This does not happen by chance, of course. Note that the previous sections discussed only 
necessary conditions for a steady state—no claims about sufficiency were made. It turns out, however, 
that the specific behavioral hypotheses and functional forms assumed by DSZ make sure that the steady 
state of the system is, indeed, given by the intersection of the two curves above. The remainder of this 
section explains the main points involved.  
  Beginning with the first point, we note that, in the model, capacity utilization is a linear (and 
positive) function of the rentiers’ wealth-to-capital ratio (for the higher rentiers’ wealth is, the higher is 
rentiers’ consumption and, therefore, the level of effective demand relative to the stock of capital). This 
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Figure 4 
 
   
On the other hand, the rate of growth of the capital stock is given by a neo-Kaleckian 
investment function, so the higher the level of capacity utilization is, the higher will be the rate of 
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It so happens that all other stocks and flows of the model can be easily calculated given B/K, 
Y/K, and Vh/K. Consumption, for instance, is assumed to depend positively on the levels of product 
and rentiers’ wealth, so C/K is given by Y/K and Vh/K. Similarly, government taxes are assumed to be 
a constant fraction of Y, while government expenditures and the stock of firms’ equities are assumed to 
be a constant fraction of K. As for the stocks, the system-wide constraints implied by table 1 above do 
most of the job. For instance, households deposits are assumed to be a (fixed, in the steady state) 
fraction of Vh—that is to say, D = (1 - δ)Vh. Moreover, we know that L+B ≡ D, so that L/K is entirely 
determined by B/K and Vh/K, for L/K = (1 - δ)Vh/K – B/K.   
  In other words, the long-period, steady-state equilibrium of the DSZ model has a reasonably 
intuitive graphical representation that allows (long-period) comparative statics exercises to be 
performed without recourse to complex and time-consuming computer simulations.
39 Moreover, and 
even though the specific curves above were derived from admittedly simplistic structural hypotheses 
and behavioral hypotheses, it appears clear to us that the equilibrium conditions stated above remain 
valid for a much broader class of SFC models and behavioral assumptions.
40  
 
3. LOOKING AT MINSKY AND AT MARGLIN-BHADURI FROM AN EXPLICITLY 
DYNAMIC SFC PERSPECTIVE: A GRAPHICAL ANALYSIS OF DSZ’S SYSTEM 
DYNAMICS AND THE POSSIBILITY OF MINSKYAN STRUCTURAL BREAKS  
 
We have said nothing so far about the dynamics of the system above. Or about why we believe it 
illuminates considerably the findings of the literatures we discussed in the first section. In this section 
we attempt to do these things. We begin by discussing how “Minskyan crises” can be conceptualized in 
the framework above. We finishing saying a few words on what we believe can be said about the 
“economic basis for contesting political ideologies.”    
  Much has been written about Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis. Although it certainly 
has an important microeconomic content,
41 Minsky himself phrased it in macroeconomic terms in 
various occasions (see, for example, the first chapters of Minsky [1982]). Here we will say that the 
                                                         
39 Interestingly enough, the graphical representation above differs considerably from the one presented in the original article. 
Needless to say, we now believe the graphs above are more intuitive than the original ones.    
40 Assuming, say, a Harrodian investment function—as opposed to a neo-Kaleckian one—would not, of course, change the 
fact that the steady state of the system requires that the net wealth of all sectors grows at the same rate as the stock of capital 
(even though it might change the precise shape of the equilibrium curves).  
41 For example, the composition of Ponzi, hedge, and speculative finance units in any given sector can fluctuate without any 
changes in the aggregate balance sheet of the sector, provided that the increase in Ponzi finance is counterbalanced by 
improvements in the balance sheets of the remaining hedge and speculative units.   
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economy is getting financially more fragile whenever L/K (a proxy of the financial fragility of firms) 
and/or L/D (a proxy of the financial fragility of banks) are increasing. At this level of abstraction, a 
Minskyan “boom” can be conceptualized as a situation in which capacity utilization is increasing (or is 
kept at a high level) and L/K and/or L/D are also increasing. It is therefore useful to notice that we can 
plot our proxy variables for the economy’s “financial fragility” in the same graph as our v-g and b-g 
curves. 
  Indeed, the facts that L = D – B and that D = (1-δ)Vh, coupled with the hypothesis that these 
ratios are bounded (say, because market participants get too anxious when they surpass given 
thresholds), limit the range of feasible long-period equilibria. Assume, for example, that λ1 and λ2 are 
these thresholds. Then it is easy to see that: (i) L/K < λ1 implies that (1-δ)Vh/K – B/K < λ1 and, 
therefore, B/K > [(1-δ)Vh/K] - λ1; and (ii) L/D < λ2 implies that 1 – [B/(1-δ)Vh] < λ2, so that B/K > (1 
- λ2) (1-δ)Vh/K. In graphical terms, these conditions mean that the economy must always be “above” 
thresholds T1 and T2.   
On the other hand, a meaningful, steady-state equilibrium requires also that L > 0 and that 
capacity utilization is below its technical maximum and above a given “satisfactory” minimum. Again, 
these restrictions can be easily incorporated in the b-g v-g diagram. Indeed, L>0 implies that (1-δ)Vh/K 
– B/K> 0, which then implies that B/K < (1-δ)Vh/K, so that the economy must be always below 
threshold T3. Moreover, the fact that capacity utilization is a positive function of Vh/K allows us to 
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  But what about the dynamics? Well, the keys to dynamic analyses in the framework above are 
the facts that: (i) B/K is falling (increasing) whenever the economy is above (below) the b-g curve; and 
(ii) Vh/K is falling (increasing) whenever the economy is below (above) the v-g curve. Remember that 
the reason why the b-g curve was supposed to have a negative slope was that, for any level of the 
capital stock, increases in Vh decrease the public deficit and increase the rate of growth of capital, so 
that the equilibrium level of B has to decrease (because this is the only way its rate of growth can 
increase even with a smaller deficit). So, it can be said that below (above) the b-g curve the stock of 
public debt is small (large) vis-à-vis the public deficit, so B must be increasing (decreasing) faster than 
the stock of capital—i.e., B/K must be rising (falling). Remember now that the reason why the v-g 
curve was supposed to have a positive slope was that, for any level of the capital stock, increases in B 
were supposed to increase rentiers’ saving. So it can be said that below (above) the v-g curve, the stock 
of rentiers’ wealth is small (large) vis-à-vis the level of rentiers’ saving, so Vh must be falling (rising) 
faster than the stock of capital—i.e., Vh/K must be falling (rising).    
  The considerations above allow us to draw the following phase diagram, which divides the b-g 




  For the purposes of this paper, the two graphs above are interesting because they make clear 
that a typical Minskyan crisis associated with firms’ increasing financial fragility can only happen in 
quadrant I—in which rentiers’ wealth and, given the liquidity preference parameter, firms’ loans are 
growing faster than capital (so capacity utilization is getting higher) and the government debt is 
growing slower than capital. A typical example is shown in figure 8:  




The aforementioned graphs also make clear that “Minskyan crises” can arise even if no 
particularly controversial non-linear hypotheses are made about the economy’s investment function—
note that the equilibrium curves above were derived from a typical neo-Kaleckian investment function.  
 We finish noting that the aforementioned graphs and analysis heavily qualify the conclusions of 
Bhaduri and Marglin (1990). More concretely, they make clear that long-period comparative statics 
exercises are considerably more complex than short-period ones—in particular, changes in the profit 
share of the economy imply nontrivial changes in both b-g and v-g curves above.  
In order to understand what happens in the long period when there is a change in the functional 
distributional of income, it is important to notice first that the combination of the neo-Kaleckian 
investment function and Kaleckian-Godleyan consumption function assumed by DSZ implies that 
short-period capacity utilization falls whenever the profit share rises—so the model is unambiguously 
“stagnationist” in the short period (for the fall in the economy’s “multiplier” more than compensates 
the increase in its “accelerator”).
42 Note, however, that the fact that short-period capacity utilization 
invariably falls in response to increases in the profit share does not necessarily mean that investment 
(and therefore gk) will also fall. Whether or not this is the case will depend on the specific parameters 
                                                         
42 Note that DSZ assumes that rentiers’ consumption in any given short period is entirely determined by their (beginning of 
the period) stock of wealth—so it does not respond to increases in their income. Therefore, increases in the profit-share 
causes the short-period multiplier to fall relatively more in DSZ than in traditional Kaleckian models with a positive value 
for capitalists’ propensity to consume out of their income.   
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of the system,
43 though the fact that workers pay taxes in DSZ makes more likely the scenario in which 
a rise in the profit share will increase the rate of growth of the stock of capital.
44 In other words, the 
economy’s short-period response to a rise in the economy’s profit share will probably combine a 
decrease in capacity utilization and an increase in investment (and gk).    
Both these facts are crucial to understand how the long-period equilibrium curves react to a 
once-and-for-all rise in the economy’s profit share. Beginning with the b-g curve, we note that it was 
derived on the assumption that, for any given level of the stock of capital, higher values of rentiers’ 
wealth implied: (i) higher values of capacity utilization and, therefore, gk; and (ii) lower values of the 
government deficit (assumed positive). In such a situation, we argued that the only way the growth rate 
of the government debt could still be equal to gk was if government debt was lower. This is, of course, 
the reason why the b-g curve has a negative slope. Now note that an increase in the profit share will 
reduce the economy’s (short-period) multiplier, so for any given level of rentiers’ wealth, output will 
be lower and the government deficit will be higher; moreover, gk is likely to be higher (because the 
likely scenario is such that the mass of profits increases in such a way as to compensate the reduction in 
capacity utilization). This, in turn, implies that the new b-g curve will probably cross the old one (see 












                                                         
43 More concretely, DSZ assumes that gk depends positively on both the mass of profits and capacity utilization. It may very 
well be the case that gk increases when the profit share of the economy increases—for the effect of the reduction in capacity 
utilization can be relatively smaller than the effect of the increase in the mass of profits (caused by the larger profit share). 
Note that the assumption of given prices can only be reconciled with a rise in the mark up and the profit share if either the 
nominal wage or labor productivity rises. In both cases, there will be a fall in taxes which, given government expenditure, 
will increase the government deficit and the mass of profits.  
44 For taxation decreases the negative impact of increases in the profit share on consumption, the more so the higher is the 
income tax rate.    




The intuition behind this result goes as follows: for lower values of B/K the “increased 
government deficit” effect (due to the lower short-period income multiplier and the lower capacity 
utilization) will more than compensate the “higher gk” effect; whereas for higher values of B/K the 
contrary is true. Let us say that for a profit-share of, say, 25%, the point Vh/K* is associated with a gk 
of, say, 3% and with a (normalized) deficit of, say, $1.50—so that the equilibrium level of B/K* is 50 
(for 1.50/50 = 0.03). Now suppose that the profit-share goes to 30%, so Vh/K* is now associated with a 
gk of, say, 3.5% and with a (normalized) deficit of, say, 2. In this case, the new equilibrium value of 
B/K is 57.15 (for 2 is 3.5% of 57.15), which is higher than the previous value of 50 (and hence the fact 
that B/K*’’ > B/K*’ in the graph above).  For higher values of B/K the contrary would be true, of 
course, and hence the fact the new b-g curve crosses the old one.   
Now what about the v-g curve? How does it change in response to a once and for all increase in 
the economy’s profit-share? The answer, again, depends on the parameters—in particular on what 
happens to rentiers’ saving.  It so happens that this latter variable can well increase considerably in 
response to an increase in the profit share (remember that rentiers receive dividends from firms and 
banks). Figure 10 depicts the likely scenario that this increase will more than compensate the “higher 
gk” effect, so that the v-g curve shifts to the right (i.e., rentiers will need less “help” from the 









As one would expect, the new equilibrium happens in the intersection of the new curves. In the 
case shown in figure 11, a higher profit share increases the steady-state (normalized) value of rentiers’ 




   
It is fair to admit at this point that the literatures discussed in the first section of this paper are 
not terribly concerned with the variables above. We believe they should, though, for these variables 
have a clear relationship with (and help to determine) the variables that happen to interest most 
macroeconomists, i.e., capacity utilization and the rate of growth of the stock of capital. In DSZ, this  
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relationship is assumed to depend crucially on the profit share of the economy. Indeed, the fact that 
increases in this latter variable reduce the multiplier of the economy means that: (i) the level of output 
generated by any given value of rentiers’ wealth will be smaller; and (ii) the level of output generated 
by all other components of aggregate demand which are exogenous to income will also be smaller. So 
both the intercept and the slope of the capacity utilization curve will be smaller and probably also the 





Nevertheless, the mere fact that capacity utilization is smaller in the new steady state does not 
mean that the rate of growth of the capital stock (and therefore of all stocks and flows of the economy, 
including income and wealth) will be smaller. The contrary can very well be true, considering that the 
slope of the gk curve is increased by the increase in the profit share of the economy (since it affects 
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Figure 13 
 
In sum, whether or not capacity utilization rises or falls in any given short period is only one of 
the relevant questions that can be asked by macroeconomists interested in the relation between the 
functional distribution of income and the level of output.  Also important is whether the new steady-
state rate of growth of the economy (which happens to be equal to the rate of growth of the stock of 
capital) will be higher or not. And it can well be—even in the openly “stagnationist” (short-period) 
economy presented by DSZ—that increases in the profit-share can increase the steady-state rate of 
growth of the economy.  
 
4. FINAL REMARKS 
 
We began this paper by presenting some critical comments on three strands of heterodox 
macroeconomic literature. Our dissatisfaction with them arises from the fact that they restrict 
themselves to short-period models (often using them to shed light on long-period phenomena).  
However, we do not want to overstate our differences with those approaches. In fact, we share 
most of their concerns and agree with most of what they imply. This is not surprising, by the way. As 
correctly pointed out by Lavoie, Rodriguez, and Seccareccia (2004), there is considerable agreement 
among heterodox economists about short-run models. But we hope to have convinced readers in these 
traditions that it is possible (at least) that those models are missing important aspects of the phenomena 
they are studying—and that the stock-flow consistent approach can help to uncover some of these yet 
unknown (longer-period or dynamic) phenomena.  
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It is important to point out that the kind of modeling we are proposing here is considerably 
different in nature from conventional ones. In particular, in spite of the hints we can find in authors 
such as Minsky, no one has ever stated clearly that the key to Post Keynesian/structuralist/heterodox 
dynamic analyses might be to take a close look at the dynamics of both the size and composition of the 
sectoral balance sheets (and to analyze it in political economy terms). This simple point is perhaps lost 
amidst the complex SFC algebra and dynamic simulations, but this does not make it any less true.   
  We noted also that we believed that it was possible to phrase the main insights of the SFC 
literature in relatively simple and intuitive terms, without having to impose on readers many pages of 
algebra and/or the burden of understanding complex computer simulations. Whether or not we were 
able to do that is up to the reader to decide. We do hope, however, to have at least unveiled some 
general truths about stock-flow consistent models which do not appear particularly clear in the papers 
of this literature. It seems to us, in particular, that the way we phrased the equilibrium conditions above 
can be useful in many other contexts, no matter which specific hypotheses are assumed about, say, any 
given macroeconomic flow variable and/or sector’s portfolio decisions.  
  We acknowledge that SFC dynamic analyses are artificial—in the sense that they are simplified 
(though consistent) constructs that, in most cases, can be said to evolve in logical time. More 
concretely, they are often built on the assumption that all short-period parameters—say, firms’ animal 
spirits, dividend policy, rentiers’ liquidity preference, the interest rates on government bills and bank 
loans, and so on—are fixed. As mentioned before, there is no good reason to assume that this will be 
true in any given “actual” economy in any length of historical time. The “Minskyan” dynamics 
depicted above, for example, are at best a preliminary approximation of a Minskyan “boom” (for it is 
fair to assume, for example, that in a boom, firms’ animal spirits would go up and rentiers’ liquidity 
preference would go down).  
Saying that SFC dynamic analyses are artificial does not mean to say that they are not 
useful. For the purposes of this paper it probably suffices to say that they can be useful if: (i) 
they imply that the economy is approaching one of the thresholds (for then it will be clear that 
something will have to change in the near future); (ii) they imply that the economy is approaching a 
sustainable (an economically meaningful) steady state (for then it will be clear that things can pretty 
much stay as they are); or (iii) there is no reason to believe that the parameters of the system will 
change dramatically in the medium run of, say, four to eight years.  
   Nothing we said so far precludes one, when doing empirical studies, from re-estimating 
parameters as soon as the next data point becomes available—so as to build a “truly dynamic” story as 
a “collage” of the different “pictures” one obtains in each different “short period.” This approach— 
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which we might as well call “Godleyan,” honoring the work done by Wynne Godley at the Department 
of Applied Economics of the University of Cambridge and the Levy Economics Institute of Bard 
College—appears to us the best way to do Post Keynesian dynamic analyses.  
Moreover, historical and theoretical knowledge can both be used so as to enrich models within 
the SFC framework, dispensing with too-simplified assumptions about the behavior of agents and their 
evolution and making more parameters endogenous to the model. We cannot imagine a better strategy 
for those who long to develop a Post Keynesian analysis that will really happen in historical time and 
will be really able to cope with the problem of “shifting equilibrium” (Kregel 1976).  
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